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With the judgment in R v Sadique and Hussain,1 the Court of Appeal can
now be added to the chorus of academic voices lamenting the im-
penetrably complex drafting of Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 20072 in
general, and the mens rea provisions in particular.3 With this in mind, it
is therefore understandable that despite the rather weak ground for
appeal in R v Sadique and Hussain,4 the court took some considerable
time working towards and setting out a simplified overview of the
relevant offence.5 Such an enterprise is clearly in great need. After all,
although the SCA’s assisting and encouraging provisions may be ‘the
most convoluted . . . in decades’,6 their extreme breadth of application,
even in comparison to the other general inchoate offences with which
they overlap considerably,7 will surely make them increasingly irresist-
ible to prosecutors.
This comment does not seek to provide an overview of the Part 2
offences as a whole.8 Rather, its focus will be narrowed to arguably only
the most complex and troublesome elements of the offences, those
relating to mens rea. The advantage of this narrowed focus is that rather
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1 [2011] EWCA Crim 2872, [2012] 1 Cr App R 19.
2 Introducing the inchoate offences of encouraging or assisting a criminal offence.
Section 59 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (hereafter ‘SCA’) abolishes the common
law offence of incitement.
3 See R v Sadique and Hussain [2011] EWCA Crim 2872, [2012] 1 Cr App R 19 at
[33], Hooper LJ. For examples of academic comment, see J. Spencer and G. Virgo,
‘Encouraging and Assisting Crime: Legislate in Haste, Repent at Leisure’ [2008]
Archbold News 7; D. Ormerod and R. Fortson, ‘Serious Crime Act 2007: The Part 2
Offences’ [2009] Crim LR 389; R. Fortson, Blackstone’s Guide to the Serious Crime Act
2007 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008).
4 The principal ground of appeal contended that SCA, s. 46 was incompatible with
Art. 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
5 See, in particular, R v Sadique and Hussain [2011] EWCA Crim 2872, [2012] 1 Cr
App R 19 at [81]–[90].
6 Ormerod and Fortson, above n. 3 at 389.
7 For example, unlike attempt and conspiracy, to be liable for assisting and
encouraging under the SCA, D need only be reckless as to the circumstances,
consequences (s. 47(5)(b)(ii)) and mens rea (s. 47(5)(a)(ii)) of the future principal
offence.
8 For work of this kind, see Ormerod and Fortson, above n. 3; Fortson, above n. 3.
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than simply sketching a single interpretation of the mens rea require-
ments, any problems within that interpretation, as well as inconsist-
encies between the interpretations of others, may be exposed and
discussed. Indeed, when looking at the guidance and analysis so far
provided in both judicial and academic commentary, it is clear that
significant problems have already arisen; problems relating to the vag-
aries of the statute itself as well as from a reliance on Law Commission
discussion (based on prior Law Commission recommendation9), which
is often inappropriate to the amended terms of the SCA.
To aid the analysis, the Part 2 offences will be separated and explored
in two separate categories. The first, comprising the s. 45 and s. 46
offences, will focus on those offences that require D to assist or en-
courage P believing that P will commit a principal offence and that D’s
actions will have assisted or encouraged its commission. The second will
focus on the s. 44 offence, where D must assist or encourage P intending
that P will be assisted or encouraged to commit the principal offence. In
each part, highlighting problems with the current analysis, the initial
question will remain (mercifully) simple: if these offences are charac-
terised by belief and intention respectively, what must D believe or intend
to be liable for the offence? The answer, as will become clear, is very little
indeed, with much of the mens rea for both categories of offence being
satisfied by mere recklessness.
Following from this base observation, this comment then seeks to set
out and summarise the minimum requirements of each offence. It is
hoped that such an analysis will aid future courts, as was attempted in R
v Sadique and Hussain.10 Beyond this, the narrow focus on mens rea will
also allow progress beyond interpretation to a further layer of analysis,
highlighting and pre-empting a number of concerns that emerge from
the identified mens rea requirements.
Sections 45 and 46: belief offences?
Starting with the terms of the SCA alone, ss 45 and 46 state (apparently)
clearly that belief is required both in relation to D’s own conduct (D must
believe that his ‘act will assist or encourage [the] commission’ of the
principal offence11), and that belief is also required by D in relation to the
future actus reus and mens rea of P (D must believe that the principal
‘offence will be committed’12). However, as is widely appreciated, the
apparent requirement for D to believe that P will complete the principal
offence must be read in conjunction with s. 47, and s. 47(5) in particular.
Here, rather than a strict requirement of belief, it is stated that (for the
two offences) D will be liable where he is merely reckless as to the
circumstance and consequence elements of P’s principal offence, as well
as P’s mens rea for that offence.
9 Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime, Law Com.
Report No. 300 (2006).
10 [2011] EWCA Crim 2872, [2012] 1 Cr App R 19 at [87].
11 SCA, s. 45(1)(b)(ii) and s. 46(1)(b)(ii).
12 SCA, s. 45(1)(b)(i) and s. 46(1)(b)(i).
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Comparing these two sets of statements, of course, reveals an appar-
ent contradiction. This is because, if the Part 2 offences require D to
believe that the principal offence will be completed (as per ss 45 and 46),
then recklessness should not be enough to satisfy D’s mens rea in relation
to any part of that offence. However, if recklessness is all that is required
of D in relation to the circumstance and consequence elements of the
principal offence, as well as the mens rea of P (as per s. 47(5)), then it
does not make sense (and is misleading) to say that D must believe that
the principal offence will be completed.
Moving to the Court of Appeal’s appraisal, it is therefore interesting
that despite seeming to recognise both sides of the apparent contra-
diction, the court in R v Sadique and Hussain does not seek a resolution.
Instead, when discussing s. 47, the court rather cryptically places belief
and recklessness alongside each other as if they were interchangeable.
At risk of over-simplification, it can be stated that the section 46 offence
requires proof of ‘full’ mens rea on the part of D in relation to the offence
which he believed would be committed, nothing less than subjective reckless-
ness will do.13
One may excuse the court in R v Sadique and Hussain on the ground that
recklessness as to elements of the principal offence was not required in
that case to find liability. However, reference to recklessness is also
absent from the court’s final outline of mens rea: an outline that is
intended to aid future courts to apply the Part 2 offences.14 In fact, if this
summary were to be applied generally, requiring D to believe that the
principal offence will be completed by P, it would effectively make the
terms of s. 47 redundant.
The answer to the apparent contradiction lies not with a choice
between the two sides, however, but through a reinterpretation of what
is meant by D believing the offence will be committed. This is because,
despite the general language of ss 45 and 46, common provisions in s.
47(3) and (4) state that in order to demonstrate that D believes the
principal offence will be committed:
it is sufficient to prove that he believed . . . that an act would be done which
would amount to the commission of that offence.
Therefore, contrary to the conclusion in R v Sadique and Hussain (and
that implied by ss 45 and 46 alone) that D must believe that P will
complete every element of the principal offence, it is sufficient that D
should only believe that P will complete the act element, with reckless-
ness being sufficient in relation to the other offence elements and
requisite mens rea (as per s. 47(5)). For example, if D lends P a jemmy to
prise open a door, it is likely that D will believe that this is what P will do.
If D also believes that the door/property being opened will not belong to
P, and that P will steal from the property once inside, it is clear that D will
be liable for an offence under s. 45 of assisting burglary. What this latest
observation adds, however, is that even if D did not believe that the
13 R v Sadique and Hussain [2011] EWCA Crim 2872, [2012] 1 Cr App R 19 at [65]
(emphasis supplied).
14 Ibid. at [87].
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property belonged to another, and did not believe that P would steal
from it, his belief as to the use of the jemmy (to open a door), combined
with recklessness as to these other elements, would still be enough to
satisfy s. 45.
Although the apparent contradiction can be thus resolved, it still
leaves language within ss 45 and 46 that is highly misleading, and has (it
seems) already misled the court in R v Sadique and Hussain in its attempts
to summarise the law. This warrants brief comment. It is by now well
established that within criminal attempts, although s. 1 of the Criminal
Attempts Act 1981 requires D to act with ‘intent to commit an offence’,
this intent need not relate to every element of the principal offence, with
fault as to circumstance elements allowed to reflect/track the mens rea of
the principal offence.15 However, the idea that D can be said to intend an
offence when reckless as to circumstances has always (and still does)
exist within a controversial and criticised fiction. For example, if D
intends to damage property unsure whether it belongs to him (circum-
stance), it seems illogical to say he intends to damage another’s property,
especially if the property in fact does belong to him.16 In light of this, it
is therefore particularly regrettable that the SCA should also employ
language of intending or believing the offence, only to qualify this (in a
later supplementary section) with recklessness, this time not only to
potential circumstances, but also consequences and the mens rea of P.
The result is even greater straining of the legal fiction. For example, if D
lends P a jemmy (as above) in the belief that P will use it to open a door,
but only foreseeing a risk that this might be in the context of a burglary,
or if D encourages P to drive home unsure whether P would be over the
alcohol limit, the idea that D believes that P will commit burglary and
believes that P will drive over the prescribed limit is very difficult to
accept. However, when applying the SCA, this is the approach that must
be employed. The language of the statute is likely to mislead courts (as
we have seen), confuse juries and where D does act with mere reckless-
ness it will also mislabel his conduct. That all this has been achieved by
a revision to the Law Commission’s original draft Bill, a Bill that clearly
stated a requirement of belief only for the criminal acts of P, makes this
latest fiction even more indefensible.17
A further problem in this area highlighted by R v Sadique and Hussain,
relating to ss 45 and 46 in particular, is the use of prior Law Commission
material to interpret specific provisions of the legislation.18 Although the
SCA is broadly based upon the Law Commission’s recommendations,
significant changes made by the government mean that such reliance
has the potential to lead to error. For example, independently of the
15 This was first recognised in R v Khan [1990] 1 WLR 813.
16 For discussion of this point in relation to criminal attempts see, R. Buxton,
‘Circumstances, Consequences and Attempted Rape’ [1984] Crim LR 25; cf.
G. Williams, ‘The Problem of Reckless Attempts’ [1983] Crim LR 365. For a more
recent discussion of this issue in relation to the range of general inchoate offences,
see J. J. Child and A. Hunt, ‘Mens Rea and the General Inchoate Offences: Another
New Culpability Framework’ Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (2012) (forthcoming).
17 Law Commission, above n. 9 (cl. 2 of the appended draft Bill).
18 Ibid.
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confusion discussed above, the court in R v Sadique and Hussain makes
particular use of the Law Commission report when discussing the differ-
ences between a s. 45 and s. 46 offence.
To take an example. D gives P a gun. Giving P a gun is . . . capable of
encouraging or assisting the commission of offences X, Y and Z . . . If it may
be that D, at the time of giving the gun, believes that one or more offences
X, Y and Z will be committed but has no belief as to which will be
committed, section 46 should be used. The Law Commission Report reveals
that section 46 is thought to be necessary because of a belief that if, in these
circumstances, D is charged with three section 45 offences, one in relation
to X, one in relation to Y and one in relation to Z, D would have to be
acquitted of each section [4519] offence if he believed that one of the three
offences, X, Y and Z, would be committed but he did not know which
one.20
Although the Court of Appeal is clearly unhappy with this example,
commenting that ‘if this is right, then we feel that the result could have
been obtained in an easier manner’,21 it nevertheless continues under
the assumption that it is correct, and the issue becomes how this affects
the presentation of an indictment. The problem, of course, is that this is
not correct. As an example to illustrate the Law Commission’s recom-
mended policy, it is very useful. The Law Commission recommends that
for D to commit (the equivalent of) a s. 45 offence, he must believe that
P will complete every element of the principal offence. Therefore, if D
believed an offence would be committed X, Y or Z, but did not know
which one, it is clear that he lacks the required belief in relation to any
of the offences individually: D believes that one will be committed, but
does not know (is reckless) as to which.22 However, as discussed above,
the effect of the government’s change in s. 47(5) is that, contrary to the
Law Commission’s recommendations, D need only believe that the act
element of P’s offence will be completed, with recklessness sufficing for
the other elements. Therefore, for example, if D believed that P would
commit an offence by shooting the gun (act) in a way that caused either
criminal damage, grievous bodily harm or murder, but did not know
which, it would be entirely possible to charge D with separate s. 45
offences: D believes that P will complete the act element of each prin-
cipal offence, and is reckless as to the other elements and fault.23
Summarising the mens rea requirements of the s. 45 and s. 46 of-
fences, the Court of Appeal states that:
D can only be convicted of the first count (offence X) if:
a. Either:
(i) D believes that X will be committed [s. 45]; or
19 Although the judgment refers to s. 46 at this point, it can be assumed that this is
the result of a typing error.
20 R v Sadique and Hussain [2011] EWCA Crim 2872, [2012] 1 Cr App R 19 at [40].
21 Ibid. at [41] (my emphasis).
22 Law Commission, above n. 9 at paras 5.90–5.94.
23 As will be discussed below, where s. 46 still provides assistance is where the
offences contemplated by D have different act elements.
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(ii) D believes that one or more of the offences specified in the
indictment (X, Y and Z) will be committed but has no belief as to
which [s. 46]; and
b. D believes that his act will encourage or assist the commission of X;
and
c. D believes that X will be committed with the necessary fault for
X.24
In light of the discussion above, however, the minimum requirements of
the s. 45 and s. 46 offences are more accurately stated as:
D can only be convicted of the first count (offence X) if:
a. D believes that his act will encourage or assist the commission of (the
act element of) X; and
b. Either:
(i) D believes that the act element of X will be committed [s. 45]; or
(ii) D believes that one or more acts of the offences specified in the
indictment (X, Y and Z) will be committed but has no belief as to
which [s. 46]; and
c. D is reckless as to whether, if the act element is completed, it will be
completed with the necessary circumstance elements of X; and
d. D is reckless as to whether, if the act element is completed, it will be
completed with the necessary consequence elements of X; and
e. D is reckless as to whether, if the act element is completed, it will be
completed with the necessary fault for X. Or, where D holds the
required fault for X.25
The differences recognised in the second summary are important for two
principal reasons. First relating to the true breadth of the offences
summarised and, second, because of the potential for future uncertainty
that becomes evident.
When discussing the breadth of the s. 45 offence above, it was
highlighted that where D assists or encourages multiple offences that
share the same act element, requiring mere recklessness as to the other
elements of the principal offence allows for considerable overlap with
s. 46 liability. However, the increased breadth of these offences (recog-
nised in the amended summary) goes well beyond an increased overlap
in relation to Maxwell26 type cases. For example, imagine that D provides
P with a gun, believing that P will shoot the gun (act), but unsure as to
whether P will do so in contravention of one of a number of offences or
potentially do so innocently. In this scenario, application of the Court of
Appeal’s summary above would find no liability for either offence:
although D believes that the act element of the principal offence will be
completed, he does not believe that the other elements of a crime will
24 R v Sadique and Hussain [2011] EWCA Crim 2872, [2012] 1 Cr App R 19 at [87].
25 This final possibility in relation to the fault required for the principal offence is
important to the outline of minimum requirements suggested here because it
allows for liability even where D does not believe that (and is not even reckless as
to whether) P will act with the required fault (s. 47(5)(iii)). For discussion, see
Ormerod and Fortson, above n. 3 at 407.
26 DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350. In this case, D was found
liable for aiding and abetting the doing of an act with the intent to cause an
explosion. D was liable despite not knowing which of a number of anticipated
offences P was going to perform.
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(not might) also be completed. However, if the amended summary
above is applied, it is clear that D does satisfy the mens rea of the s. 45
offence: he believes that the act element will be completed, and is
reckless as to the completion of the other elements and fault. This
interpretation of the s. 46 offence then widens potential liability even
further. Requiring the same mens rea as above in relation to the circum-
stances, consequences and fault of the principal offence, s. 46 goes
further by allowing for liability even where D does not know which of a
number of possible act elements will be completed by P. Thus, as long as
D believes that P will complete one of a number of acts, each of which D
thinks may be part of a particular criminal action, D will not escape
liability even where he thinks those actions may alternatively be done
innocently.
The second reason for highlighting the differences between the sum-
maries above relates to important questions within the law that are
hidden in the first summary. Particularly, having identified the different
standards of mens rea required in relation to the act element of the
principal offence compared to the other elements, it becomes apparent
(as it does not from the first summary) that a reliable definition of the act
element is required in order to identify it for this separate treatment.
Returning to an earlier example, imagine that D lends P a jemmy
believing that P will use the jemmy to open a door, but reckless as to
whether it will be his own door or the door of another in the context of
a burglary. If the act element of the offence is interpreted (as it was
above) as the ‘opening of a door’ with the ownership of the door/
property as a circumstance, then D will have the mens rea required for
the s. 45 offence: belief as to the act and recklessness as to the other
elements and fault. However, if the act element is interpreted as the
‘opening of another’s door’, then D does not act with this belief and will
avoid liability. Without an objective definition to separate the act ele-
ment, this problem will arise when applying the Part 2 offences to
almost all criminal offences.
Indeed, the potential problems caused by the absence of clear and
objective definitions can already be identified within early academic
commentary. For example, within Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law when
discussing potential liability for assisting and encouraging murder under
s. 45, Ormerod states that ‘in the example with the supply of the gun
[and assisting murder], D must believe that P will use the gun to cause
death’.27 However, for this to be right, it must therefore be that P’s act
includes within its definition the causing of death. But for most, includ-
ing Ormerod just a few lines later, death is rather seen as part of the
consequence element of murder. As above, this is not simply a trivial
question of categorisation. If D assists or encourages P merely reckless as
to whether P goes on to cause death, then whether ‘death’ is considered
part of the act element (requiring belief) or the consequence element
27 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th edn (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 2011) 475.
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(satisfied by recklessness) or even overlapping both (requiring pre-
sumably belief) becomes central to his potential liability for an offence
(assisting and encouraging murder) that carries a maximum sentence of
life imprisonment. Attempting to provide a workable definition of the
act element is a task that has exercised the minds of criminal academics
in a theoretical sense for many years.28 However, with the SCA explicitly
structured in a manner that requires such identification in every case,
the lack of a definition means that this type of dispute and uncertainly
will now have serious practical implications.
Section 44: intention offence?
Beginning with the text of s. 44, it is interesting to note that although the
offence clearly requires D to intend that his own actions should assist or
encourage P (‘intends to encourage or assist its commission’29), unlike
the s. 45 and s. 46 offences, it is silent as to D’s mens rea in relation to the
completion of the principal offence by P.
The fact that D’s mens rea as to the principal offence is not set out in s.
44 does not, of course, mean that the offence does not require mens rea
of this type. As discussed above, the minimum requirement that D
should be reckless in relation to the circumstances, consequences and
fault30 of the principal offence (s. 47(5)) applies to s. 44 liability exactly
as it did to the other Part 2 offences. In fact, although it is necessary again
to look to s. 47 to understand the s. 44 offence, the lack of detail in s. 44
at least avoids the apparent contradiction so unhelpful to understanding
ss 45 and 46. Therefore, if D intentionally encourages P to drive for
example, reckless as to whether P is over the prescribed alcohol limit
(circumstance), D will be caught by the s. 44 offence. However, if D did
not foresee the risk that P would be over the limit, he will avoid
liability.
Although apparent conflict with s. 47 is avoided, the lack of detail in
s. 44 relating to D’s fault as to P’s future offence has the potential to
create new problems. This is particularly clear with regard to the mens rea
required of D as to P’s future act element.31 Within the Law Commis-
sion’s recommendations and draft Bill, it is clearly stated that for D to
commit (the equivalent of) the s. 44 offence, he must intend for P to
complete the act element.32 However, the lack of an equivalent provi-
sion in the SCA has already led to uncertainty. Ormerod, for example,
28 For some more recent work in this area, see M. S. Moore, Act and Crime: The
Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 1993); P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1997).
29 SCA, s. 44(1)(b).
30 ‘Fault’ is again subject to the special provision allowing liability where D is not
reckless as to the fault of P, but does have the requisite mens rea for the principal
offence himself (SCA, s. 47(5)(iii)).
31 For the s. 45 and s. 46 offences, it will be remembered, D’s required fault in relation
to the act element of P’s principal offence is gleaned from the terms of s. 45 and
s. 46 themselves.
32 See Law Commission, above n. 9 at paras 5.86–5.89 and cl. 1(3)(a). See also
R. Sullivan, ‘Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime—the Law
Commission Report’ [2006] Crim LR 1047 at 1050.
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has clearly proceeded under the assumption that an intention to assist or
encourage P’s act element (s. 47(2)) implies that D must also intend that
that act element be completed.33 However, as the Law Commission
highlighted in its Report, this conclusion is by no means self-evident,
drawing attention to disagreement on the issue in the Canadian courts.34
Confirming this point, it is noted that Fortson has taken a different line
to Ormerod and interpreted the SCA to require (for each of the three
Part 2 offences) ‘that D believed that an act would be done [by P] “which
would amount to the commission of that offence”’.35
Whilst recognising both options of intention or belief as to P’s future
acts, a further option that has not yet been considered in the literature is
one based on recklessness. Although, as Ormerod rightly points out,
where D intends to assist or encourage P’s acts it will be unusual that he
does not also intend (or at least believe) that they will be completed.
However, such cases are not unimaginable. For example, take a scenario
in which P is complaining to a friend D about a third party (V) that has
wronged him in some way, and repeatedly telling D that he is going to
punch V for what he has done. Where such hollow threats have been
common in the past, it may well be that D’s intentional encouragement
of P to go through with his threat is simply an attempt to cut the
conversation short. D may know that P is very unlikely to carry out the
threats and certainly not want him to do so. D intends to encourage P’s
act, but he is merely reckless as to its completion.
Having recognised recklessness as to P’s future acts as theoretically
consistent with an intention to encourage them, a number of reasons
emerge why this interpretation of s. 44’s minimum requirements may
be preferred. First, if intention or belief were desired by drafters of the
statute, then it is strange they are not explicitly set out in a manner
reflecting the equivalent drafting of the s. 45 and s. 46 offences.36
Secondly, it could be contended that the language of s. 47(5) in partic-
ular implies a recklessness standard. For example, setting out the fault
requirements in relation to the other elements of the principal offence,
this is done in the context of an act element ‘if done’ and ‘were the act
to be done’, terminology that seems (in the absence of contrary provi-
sions37) to imply risk rather than belief or intention. Finally, a require-
ment of recklessness would also be consistent with D’s mens rea for the
rest of the principal offence, and in line with the general presumption of
mens rea where a statute is non-specific.38
With this discussion in mind, the minimum mens rea requirements of
the s. 44 offence can now be summarised as:
D can only be convicted of assisting or encouraging offence X if:
33 See Ormerod, above n. 27 at 474, where it is stated that ‘unlike s 44, [for s. 45 and
s. 46] D need not intend that the criminal act by P should be done’.
34 Law Commission, above n. 9 at paras 5.73–5.77.
35 Fortson, above n. 3 at para. 6.100 (my emphasis).
36 SCA, s. 45(b) and s. 46(1)(b).
37 For s. 45 and s. 46 offences, of course, s. 47(3)(a) and (4)(a) make it clear that a
belief standard is required.
38 R v G [2008] UKHL 37, [2009] 1 AC 92.
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a. D intends that his act will encourage or assist the commission (of the
act element) of X; and
b. D is reckless as to whether the act element of X will be completed;
and
c. D is reckless as to whether, if the act element is completed, it will be
completed with the necessary circumstance elements of X; and
d. D is reckless as to whether, if the act element is completed, it will be
completed with the necessary consequence elements of X; and
e. D is reckless as to whether, if the act element is completed, it will be
completed with the necessary fault for X. Or, where D holds the
required fault for X.39
As before, having set out a summary of the mens rea requirements, it is
useful to reflect briefly on their implications. The first point to be noted,
perhaps even more than in the context of the s. 45 and s. 46 offences
above, is the extent to which recklessness dominates D’s mens rea
requirements. Going well beyond its original Law Commission equiva-
lent that required intention and belief that the elements of the principal
offence would be completed,40 D will be liable under the s. 44 offence
whenever he intends to assist or encourage the act element of an offence
even if he is merely reckless as to whether any part of that offence will
actually come about. For example, if D intentionally encourages P to
drive (act), reckless as to whether P is over the prescribed alcohol limit,
and even reckless as to whether P will in fact drive,41 he will be caught
by the s. 44 offence.42 It in interesting to note that the Court of Appeal
in R v Blackshaw43 makes repeated reference to the fact that the acts of
encouragement it was dealing with (using social media sites to en-
courage rioting) were ‘no joke’44 and that D ‘believed that the offences
he was inciting would happen’.45 Although such language is best read in
line with the court’s focus on sentencing, it is nevertheless interesting
that D could still be liable for a s. 44 offence even if his encouragement
was a joke. For example, if D posted messages on public social media
encouraging others to riot, then it would be hard for him to claim that he
did not intend to encourage. That D may have been joking, that he did
not intend or believe that the offences (rioting) would actually happen,
would make no difference to his liability so long as he was at least
39 This final possibility in relation the fault required for the principal offence is
important to the outline of minimum requirements set out here because it allows
for liability even where D does not intend that (and is not even reckless as to
whether) P will act with the required fault (SCA, s. 47(5)(iii)). For discussion, see
Ormerod and Fortson, above n. 3 at 407.
40 Law Commission, above n. 9 at cl. 1 of the draft Bill.
41 The assumption here is that the interpretation of s. 44 (above) is correct, requiring
D to be merely reckless as to whether the act element of the principal offence will
be completed. However, even if belief or intention were required (as per Ormerod
and Fortson respectively), recklessness as to the other elements of the principal
offence still provide for extremely wide liability.
42 With such a wide offence, the important role played by the (rather vague) s. 50
defence of ‘acting reasonably’ will be increased further.
43 R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] Crim LR 57.
44 Ibid. at [53] and [57].
45 Ibid. at [57].
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reckless. Such a conviction would not, of course, be possible under any
of the other general inchoate offences.
The other issue that is interesting to touch briefly upon in relation to
the summary above is that of double or infinite inchoate liability (for
example, where D is liable for assisting or encouraging a conspiracy to
commit a principal offence). As has been widely appreciated,46 as well as
creating the new assisting and encouraging offences, Part 2 of the SCA
has also dramatically increased the availability (and therefore like-
lihood) of such liability. However, although commentators have rightly
drawn attention to this shift, they have tended to play down its sig-
nificance in terms of a potential to give rise to over- (or inappropriate)
criminalisation on the basis that double inchoate liability is limited to the
s. 44 intention offence rather than the supposedly broader s. 45 and s. 46
offences. However, as before, it is important to recognise that although
the Law Commission’s equivalent to the s. 44 offence remained rela-
tively narrow (and therefore provided the check the Law Commission
felt necessary to broaden double inchoate liability47), this is not true of
the s. 44 offence as enacted. For example, the Law Commission uses the
example of D who makes a room available (assists) two others so that
they can make a plan (conspire) to murder V. For the Law Commission,
D is rightly liable for assisting a conspiracy to murder because he is
intending to assist and ‘intending they should commit the offence of
conspiracy to murder’.48 The Law Commission then contrasts this with D
who does not so intend, but merely believes the conspiracy will be
formed. The Law Commission’s view is that D should not be liable in
such a situation.49 Going beyond both of these possibilities however,
s. 44 now creates the potential for double inchoate liability even where
D intentionally assists or encourages P, reckless as to whether P will
complete the actus reus of that offence (in this case, to form an agree-
ment), and reckless as to P’s fault in relation to the potential principal
offence to follow (in this case, P’s intention to commit murder). Again,
this clearly highlights another area likely to cause significant problems
for courts in the future.50
Conclusion
Several writers, including myself, have been critical of the offences in
Part 2 of the SCA.51 The purpose of the foregoing discussion, however,
46 See, e.g., Ormerod and Fortson, above n. 3 at 409; Fortson, above n. 3 at
paras 6.77–6.95.
47 Law Commission, above n. 9 at Part 7.
48 Ibid. at para. 7.20.
49 Ibid.
50 As above, even if Ormerod’s contention that intending to assist or encourage an act
element implies a requirement to intend the completion of that act is accepted, it is
still contended that intention in relation to the act alone would provide insufficient
protection from the potential for inappropriate criminalisation.
51 Such criticisms have not only focused on the potential over-inclusiveness of the
Part 2 offences, but also their potential under-inclusiveness. See, e.g., Spencer and
Virgo, above n. 3; and, to a lesser extent, Ormerod and Fortson, above n. 3. For a
discussion of potential under-inclusiveness, see the later discussion of inchoate
procurement in J. J. Child, ‘The Differences Between Attempted Complicity and
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has been to address and discuss the logically prior question as to what
the minimum mens rea requirements of the offences actually are. It
emerges from that inquiry that the vast majority of the mens rea require-
ments for both offences do not require belief or intention, but rather are
satisfied by mere recklessness. It is not correct, therefore, to refer to
these offences, and to distinguish them from one another as categories
of offences requiring either belief, on the one hand, or intention on the
other. It is surely more accurate to regard these offences as being risk
based: criminalising D for believing or intending to create the risk that a
future offence will be committed. Whether the existence of offences
which impose liability in such situations is acceptable is a matter which
has not been expressly addressed here. However, it is hoped that the
analysis set out above will serve to provide a legally accurate account of
what the minimum mens rea requirements of the offences are. This is
sought so as to provide a sounder basis for application in the courts, as
well as a sounder basis for writers proceeding to debate the appropriate-
ness of these offences.
Inchoate Assisting and Encouraging—A Reply to Professor Bohlander’ [2010] Crim
LR 924.
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